Abstract-Psychologists and economists have argued that rewards often have hidden costs. One possible reason is that the principal may have incentives to offer higher rewards when she knows the task is difficult. Our experiment tests if high rewards embody such bad news and if this is correctly perceived by their recipients. Our design allows us to decompose the overall effect of rewards on effort into a direct incentive and an informational effect. The results show that participants correctly interpret high rewards as bad news. In accordance with theory, the negative informational effect coexists with the direct positive effect.
I. Introduction
R EWARDS are used in many types of relationships. While there is much evidence that rewards can be an effective way of motivating people, a vast collection of experiments shows that rewards can have unintended adverse consequences. Often these negative effects of rewards are hidden at first and do not manifest themselves until later in the relationship. For instance, the promise of a gift for obtaining high grades at school may well keep a child studying hard while at the same time undermining any genuine interest in learning and thereby having profound negative consequences later. Similarly, promising a gratification to employees for successfully completing a project may well temporarily increase their efforts, only to result in a reduced interest in their job afterward. A good understanding of why and when such negative effects are most likely to occur is important for the optimal design of contracts and other incentive schemes.
We conducted an experiment to bring these hidden costs to the surface. We study an environment in which the principal has incentives to promise a higher bonus when she knows that the task is difficult. We find that agents understand this and interpret the bonus as bad news. This negative informational effect induces costs that are usually hidden because in the short term, they are outweighed by the direct positive incentive effect. Our experimental design allows us to decompose the overall impact on motivation into these two different effects, a feature that distinguishes our experiment from the existing literature.
In our experiment, two players are anonymously matched to each other-one in the role of the principal ("she"), the other in the role of the agent ("he"). The design is based on a simplified version of the model by Bénabou and Tirole (2003) that gives a game-theoretic explanation for the hiddencosts effect based on information asymmetries. A key element is that the agent is uncertain about the task difficulty (i.e., cost of effort), while the principal knows whether the task is easy or difficult. In the first stage, the principal decides on an upfront fixed wage and a bonus that is contingent on good performance. In the second stage, after observing the bonus and the wage, the agent makes a binary decision on whether to exert effort. Good performance requires exerting effort and results in a higher joint profit of the players regardless of the task difficulty. Parameters are such that without a bonus, the agent would gain from exerting effort on the easy task, which is sufficiently self-rewarding, but not on the difficult task. In equilibrium, the principal offers a bonus only when she observes high costs. Thus, a high reward increases effort but brings bad news for the agent, resulting in potential hidden costs.
The key feature we introduced in the experimental design is an additional project for the agent. Besides the joint project with the principal, the agent also chooses an effort level for his own project. The only difference between the projects is that the bonus and the wage specified by the principal do not apply to the agent's own project. This takes away the incentive effect of the bonus but not the information effect, and therefore it allows us to isolate the informational content as perceived by the agent.
Our empirical results provide clear support for the main predictions of the model. First, a high bonus turns out to be very effective in stimulating effort in the joint project through the direct incentive effect (the monetary benefits of the reward). Second, we find that the bonus offered by the principal is strongly positively related to the difficulty of the project: when costs are high, the principal is 50 percentage points more likely to give a bonus. Thus, the bonus is very informative about the cost level, and the principal understands the need to offer a high reward when costs are high. Finally, we find evidence of the informational effect of rewards (the hidden costs): rewards are correctly perceived by the agents as conveying bad news, decreasing their motivation to invest in their own project. This effect becomes especially strong in later rounds. In the last ten rounds, the likelihood of the agents' exerting high effort on their own project is around 34 percentage points lower after receiving a bonus.
To investigate the agents' reaction to bonuses that have no informational content, we also introduced a control treatment in which the principal had no private information about the task. As predicted, we find that in the control treatment, a bonus is still very effective in stimulating effort in the joint project, but the negative effect on effort in the own project is mostly absent. A possible further concern might be that 56 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS a high bonus signals the principal's altruistic attitude rather than task difficulty. Therefore, as a further control, we also elicited some components of social preferences of participants using various modifications of a trust game. We do not find any evidence that the above results are driven by fairness considerations.
This paper is related to a vast literature that explores crowding out of intrinsic motivation by rewards or other types of extrinsic incentives. 1 Experiments in social psychology, starting from Deci (1971) , Kruglanski, Friedman, and Zeevi (1971) and Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973) , have shown that a promise of a performance-contingent reward for an interesting task may undermine a participant's attitude to the task and make his or her future engagement in similar activities less likely in the absence of rewards. This longterm negative effect (the hidden costs) may coexist with the immediate positive effect of rewards that act as short-term reinforcers. Two types of arguments have been put forward for explaining such effects. The first emphasizes the controlling aspect of rewards. Rewards undermine participants' self-determination to engage in the task and do the task well (see Deci & Ryan, 1985) . The other underscores the informational aspects of rewards: agents perceive high rewards as embodying bad news about task difficulty and their ability to complete the task successfully. In both cases there is an "overjustification effect"; for example, in the latter case, people start to attribute their engagement in any activity to the external rewards, displacing part of their intrinsic interest. In psychology, these ideas can be accommodated by theories based on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) or, alternatively, self-perception theory (Bem, 1967) . Bénabou and Tirole (2003) explore this idea in a game-theoretic framework and show that these hidden costs can indeed occur as an equilibrium phenomenon. 2 More broadly, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) can be seen as a part of the literature on contextual inference, which explains seemingly anomalous behavior by the inferences that people make from the context they face, be it incentives, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2003) , or product lines, as in Kamenica (2008) . Contextual inference is one of the central ideas that allows Kamenica (2012) to provide a unifying perspective on crowding-out effects and other behavioral anomalies.
Note that controlling and informational aspects of rewards can also be interrelated. For instance, the model by Bénabou and Tirole (2003) demonstrates that rewards and punishments can have a negative impact on prosocial behavior 1 See Frey (1997) , Frey and Jegan (2001), and Falk (2002) for a discussion of many earlier contributions. Extensive reviews can also be found in Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) and Deci and Ryan (1985) . See also Lepper, Henderlong, and Gingras (1999) and Eisenberger, Pierce, and Cameron (1999) for a different perspective. For more recent surveys, see Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011) and Kamenica (2012) .
2 That high-powered incentives in one dimension crowd out effort in the other is also consistent with the seminal model of multitasking by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . However, in Bénabou and Tirole (2003) the mechanism is purely informational, while in that model, crowding out occurs because of convex costs and substitutability of effort on different dimensions.
because they create doubts about the true motives of altruistic behavior. This way, the extrinsic incentives may reduce the importance of concerns for social (and self) respect as they deprive people of the ability to demonstrate their best intentions and qualities to others (and themselves) by prosocial actions. 3 In a recent experiment Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) convincingly demonstrate the importance of image motivation for prosocial behavior.
Of course, agents can make proper inferences from rewards only if they are aware of the principals' objectives. In Deci (1971) and related experiments, however, rewards have been administered by the experimenter, whose objectives were not clear to participants. To the best of our knowledge ours is the first experiment in which rewards are determined by active participants with well-defined objectives that are common knowledge to all participants, and the information asymmetry about the task is directly introduced into the experiment in a controlled manner.
Another important strand of literature demonstrates crowding-out effects in experimental labor markets, often using variations of the gift-exchange game by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) and Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) . In contrast to our work, all of these studies are focused on how extrinsic incentives interact with various aspects of broadly defined social preferences. In particular, Fehr and Gächter (2001) show that the use of both performancecontingent rewards and sanctions reduces effort provision and aggregate payoffs (see also Fehr & List, 2004) . Fehr and Schmidt (2007) show that adding a stick (a fine) to a carrot (a bonus) in an incentive contract may have a detrimental effect on the agents' performance. Relatedly, in a modified trust game where the investor has an option to impose sanctions on the trustee for insufficient cooperation, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) show that using the option to fine the trustee backfires compared to a pure trust game where this option is unavailable. In contrast, withdrawing from applying this option when it is available has a positive impact on both the aggregate and the principal's own average payoff. An explanation put forward in these experiments is that the principal's reliance on extrinsic incentives or control signals her lack of trust in the agent, who then reciprocates by behaving in a distrustful manner.
In a field experiment, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) find that introducing a fine on parents who arrive late to collect their children at a day care increases the occurrences of late-coming parents rather than deters parents from doing so.
3 Related theoretical contributions include Janssen and MendysKamphorst (2004) , who examine the dynamics of prosocial behavior when extrinsic incentives for such behavior change, and Seabright (2009) , who analyzes prosocial behavior in a signaling and screening context, taking into account that this can induce assortative matching between agents. Two other related papers with an emphasis on information transmission are Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) , where the principal's choice of an incentive scheme is informative about her character, which affects the agent's desire to seek her esteem, and Sliwka (2007) , who argues that information about social norms of behavior can be transmitted from more informed principals to less informed agents via the choice of incentive schemes.
They interpret this effect in terms of learning by the parents about the mildness of the day care owners. Ariely, Gneezy, et al. (2009) find a detrimental effect on performance when rewards become very high, consistent with the idea that people experience increased arousal and choke under pressure. In contrast, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) show that very small performance-contingent rewards impair the agents' performance compared to no-reward condition, possibly because they insult them.
Several experimental studies show that other types of interventions can have a detrimental impact on performance. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) showed that the principal's choice to control the agent (i.e., enforce a minimum effort) reduces the agents' performance because most agents perceive control as a signal of distrust and low expectations by the principal. Galbiati, Schlag, and ven der Weele (2013) examine the effects of sanctions in a coordination game. Cooperative subjects perceive endogenous sanctions by a third party as a negative signal about the contributions of others, which takes away the sanction effect. Relatedly, Charness et al. (2012) showed that delegating the wage choice to agents increases effort. Dickinson and Villeval (2008) study the relation between the degree of monitoring and effort, finding some support for crowding out.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model. In section III, we describe the experimental setup and hypotheses. The results are described in section V, and section VI concludes.
II. The Model

A. Informed Principal
The main treatment of our experiment is based on a simplified version of the model by Bénabou and Tirole (2003) . There are two risk-neutral players: a principal (she) and an agent (he). The agent works on a task that is potentially selfrewarding. He chooses a binary effort level, e ∈ {0, 1}. The low level of effort, e = 0, implies no cost and leads to payoffs A 0 and P 0 for the agent and the principal, respectively. The high level of effort, e = 1, costs c > 0 to the agent. It results in a higher output and yields an additional payoff of ΔA > 0 for the agent and ΔP > 0 for the principal. To stimulate the agent, the principal may promise a bonus b to be paid if the agent chooses the high effort level. Thus, her payoff is
where b ∈ {0, b}. The agent's payoff is
There is uncertainty about the cost of effort. It is common knowledge that c is equally likely to be high, c H , or low, c L < c H . This can be interpreted as uncertainty about the difficulty of the task. The principal is perfectly informed about the difficulty of the task. The agent has only a rough idea about the level of costs: he receives a private signal, s, about the cost of effort, which assumes two possible values, s ∈ {s L , s H }. With probability r > 0.5 the signal is correct; that is, signal s i arrives when costs are c i , i ∈ {H, L}. This is a discrete version of the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) assumption. Thus, receiving signal s L is "good news" for the agent. The signal determines the agent's intrinsic motivation to do the task, that is, his motivation to exert effort in the absence of any interaction with the principal. The principal does not observe the agent's private signal.
A situation where the principal is better informed about the difficulty of the task is not exceptional; it arises whenever the task is new to the agent, whereas the principal has observed other agents working on similar tasks before. The principal may be an experienced manager, a teacher, or a parent, while the agent is a young employee, a student, or a child. It is also natural to assume that the agent receives a private signal. For instance, agents with different prior experience may have different interpretations of the available public information. Moreover, agents may have received opinions about the task from fellow employees. Both types of information might well be noisy and unobservable to the principal. 4 In this model, a bonus promised by the principal affects the agent's motivation by two channels. First, it directly increases the agent's incentives to exert high effort by providing a monetary compensation. Second, because it is offered by an informed principal, it potentially affects the agent's beliefs about the difficulty of the task. Before describing the equilibrium, we emphasize that we present a restricted version of Bénabou and Tirole's model. While our version captures its essential features, the original model is more general and has a much broader set of applications. In particular, the principal may be better informed about not only characteristics of the task, but also the agent's personal qualities. Although we have restricted the set of feasible bonuses, the main results of Bénabou and Tirole (2003) 
The first claim is straightforward: the agent must be more likely to exert effort after receiving a higher bonus. If this were not the case, the principal would never want to offer the higher bonus in equilibrium. The second claim relies heavily on the two-sided asymmetric information: the principal is privately informed about the true cost of effort, while the agent privately observes a signal about the cost. When the cost is low, the agent is more likely to be optimistic. Hence, it is cheaper for the principal to rely on his intrinsic motivation and not provide additional incentives (the so-called trust effect). While the presence of two-sided asymmetric information complicates the model, it is not only a natural assumption as we argued before but also gives the model predictive power. 6 Finally, the third claim captures the essential idea that rewards bring bad news; it follows immediately from the second part of the proposition.
To make the model nontrivial, we impose several restrictions on parameters. First, we assume that ΔP > b; otherwise, the principal would never find it worthwhile to offer a bonus. Moreover, for the agent's decision problem to be nontrivial, we assume that were the agent to know the cost of effort, he would exert effort without a bonus if costs are low but not if costs are high: c L < ΔA < c H . Exerting effort without any bonus can be thought of as reflecting the intrinsic motivation. Finally, we assume that the bonus is sufficiently high to make effort attractive even if costs are high: b + ΔA > c H . Under these assumptions, there are two possible types of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria that satisfy the D1 refinement (Cho & Kreps, 1987) . The first one is a pooling equilibrium in which the principal never offers a bonus. The second type is the more interesting partially separating equilibrium in which the principal never offers the bonus if the cost of effort is low and randomizes between the bonus and no bonus when the cost is high. 7 In the experiment, we selected parameter values under which the equilibrium outcome is unique and partially separating, so that being offered a bonus is informative about the cost of effort. The pooling equilibrium with no bonus does not exist if the agent's signal is sufficiently precise because the principal who observes high cost prefers to offer a bonus rather than have the agent exert no effort with a high probability. The chosen parameter values are summarized in table 1. 6 Without the agent's private information, there is no trust effect and the model loses its predictive power. In particular, our model (given the choices for parameters) would have a continuum of pooling, uninformative equilibria in the absence of the agent's private signal. In a more general model, the multiplicity would remain; moreover, both informative and uninformative equilibria would be possible (for more details, see section E of the supplementary content).
7 For this game, the intuitive criterion (Cho & Kreps, 1987) is too weak to eliminate equilibria supported by beliefs that do not seem very plausible. For instance, there may be a pooling equilibrium in which the principal offers a bonus under any costs, sustained by the agent's belief that no bonus means high costs. Since effort and the bonus are binary decisions, from here on we simply say that the choice is between effort and no effort and a bonus or no bonus. It is straightforward to verify that the equilibrium outcome is as follows (see the appendix at the end of the paper for a proof): 
• The principal offers no bonus if costs are low (c = c L ) and randomizes between no bonus and bonus b if costs are high (c = c H ).
• The agent exerts effort if he is promised bonus b or receives a good signal (or both). If he receives a bad signal and is promised no bonus, he randomizes between effort and no effort. 8
The model itself does not explicitly take into account social preferences. In the experiment, however, we also allow the principal to provide an upfront fixed wage that is independent of success. This wage may be used as an additional channel to adjust differences in payoffs between the players. Although some additional perfect Bayesian equilibria exist with the fixed-wage option, in the appendix we prove that none of these additional equilibria satisfy the D1 criterion when the agent's private signal is sufficiently precise (i.e., r > b/ΔP). The implemented parameters satisfy this condition, so no strictly positive fixed wage is used in equilibrium and proposition 2 still holds.
B. Uninformed Principal
In a control treatment of the experiment, we analyze the same model but assume that the principal does not observe the difficulty of the project when she sets bonus b. Let bonuses b L , b H be determined by:
Then the agent's best response is to exert effort if he is offered bonus b b H or if offered a bonus b b L and he received signal s L . Under our parameterization, b L = 0 and b H = 7.5. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome, the (uninformed) principal offers no bonus, and the agent chooses e = 1 if he receives a good signal and e = 0 otherwise.
III. Experimental Setup and Hypotheses
A. Design
The experiment implements the model described in section II, with parameter values as summarized in table 1. We first describe the main treatment ("informed condition"). In every round, two players are anonymously matched to each otherone in the role of principal, the other in the role of agent. There are two stages. In the first stage, the principal observes the difficulty of the project (c L = 15 or c H = 45) and then specifies the bonus b ∈ {0, 20} and the fixed wage w ∈ {0, 5, 10} for the agent. The fixed wage is paid to the agent regardless of the agent's choices, and the bonus is paid only if the agent chooses the high level of effort.
In the second stage, the agent (who so far knows only that c = 15 or c = 45 with equal probabilities) observes the bonus and the wage offered by the principal and acquires a private signal about the difficulty of the project (which is correct with probability 3/4). Then he chooses whether to exert effort on this joint project, e J ∈ {0, 1}. High effort by the agent increases the payoff for both players by ΔP = ΔA = 30.
A key feature of the design is to introduce the second, own project for the agent. The principal derives no benefit from the agent's own project, and therefore the bonus applies only to the joint project. In all other respects, the two projects are identical; in particular, their cost realizations are perfectly correlated, and the agent receives a single informative signal that applies equally to both projects he is facing. The agent chooses the effort level e I ∈ {0, 1} that he wants to apply to his own project simultaneously with his choice of e J . Since the agent receives no bonus for his own project, the bonus cannot be a direct motivator in this case. However, insofar as the agent infers any information from the bonus, this inference will have an impact on his effort level in both tasks.
This feature of the experiment allows us to distill the informational aspects of rewards as perceived by the agent from the direct incentive effects. Alternatively, we could have asked the agent to report his beliefs about the costs. However, asking for beliefs would have made it salient that we expect adjustments in beliefs depending on the bonus, prompting participants to think more consciously of this. Our approach is an attempt to minimize this potential problem.
As in many other experiments (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993) , the task is one of stated effort rather than real effort. While a real effort task adds realism, an important advantage of using a stated effort task is that we know precisely the disutility of effort function and can therefore compute the optimal choices in equilibrium. This way, we can control any differences in the ability or cost of effort separately from personal characteristics such as risk aversion that may otherwise be correlated with the cost of effort (Charness & Kuhn, 2011) . In our context, it is particularly important to have precise information about the exact structure of the two-sided private information and rule out any interference with private information about ability and cost of effort, since we focus on the informational aspects of rewards. Although there is only very limited evidence on this issue, Brüggen and Strobel (2007) provide some evidence that a stated effort task yields qualitatively similar results to a real effort task and is an appropriate way of implementing an effort decision.
Besides the main treatment, we had a control treatment (uninformed condition). In the control treatment, the principal was not given any private information on the costs. This was common knowledge to the players. By comparing the agents' reaction to bonuses offered by the informed and uninformed principals, we have a robustness check to determine the extent to which the agents' reaction to bonuses is explained by the principals' access to private information about the task.
Finally, in six of the eight sessions, we added a third stage where we measure several dimensions of social preferences. We used this as an extra robustness check to ensure that the behavior we find is not due to other-regarding preferences. For this, we implemented a design based on Cox (2004) , with between-subject procedures being replaced by within-subject ones. First, participants were matched in pairs and played a standard trust game. The sender was endowed with twenty points and could send any multiple of five to the receiver (denoted by st, for "sent in trust game"). The amount sent was tripled, and the receiver then decided how much to return (rt, "return in trust game"). Every participant played this game in both roles, using the strategy method for receivers (i.e., asking about their reaction to all possible actions by the sender). The main reason for using the strategy method was avoiding emotional spillovers to subsequent periods rather than generating more data. In the third round, every participant played the game once more as a sender, but this time without an option for receivers to return any amount (sd, for "sent in dictator game"). Finally, each participant played once more as a receiver, but now with the amount received being randomly determined by the computer rather than being selected by the matched sender (rr, "returned if amount random"). The computer-generated amount was subtracted from the matched sender's account. Participants faced different partners in different periods.
The purpose of this design is to have a multidimensional measure of social attitudes. Based on the data collected, we constructed four variables reflecting social preferences. Altruism is defined as the fraction out of the endowment sent to the receiver in the dictator game (sd/20). The difference in fraction sent between the dictator game and the trust game is used as a proxy for trust (st/20 − sd/20) . We define fairness as the fraction of the amount received that is returned to the sender when the amount received was determined randomly (rr/received, averaged over the possible positive amounts received). The degree of reciprocity (rt/received − rr/received) is defined as the difference in fraction returned between this treatment and the treatment where the amount received was determined by the sender. We classify participants who are above median on these measures as Altruist, Trusting, Fair, and Reciprocal.
B. Procedures
We ran eight sessions. The number of participants in each session varied between 18 and 24, depending on how many showed up. In four of the sessions, we formed independent subgroups with at least ten subjects in every group to increase the number of independent observations. This gives us a total of 12 independent groups (4 groups with 10, 5 groups with 12, 2 groups with 18, and 1 group with 24). A total of 156 participants played 32 rounds of the game, with 20 rounds in the informed condition and 12 in the uninformed condition. 9 We let them play more rounds in the informed condition because of its additional complexity relative to the uninformed condition. Half of the groups started in the informed condition (I-U groups) and the other half in the uninformed condition (U-I groups). Participants were rematched after every round to approximate the one-shot nature of the game. Group sizes were too small to ensure that participants never met more than once, but the matching was anonymous and we explained to them that no participant would ever meet the same participant more than once within cycles of five consecutive rounds. All players switched roles at certain points, so that they played half of the time as principal and half of the time as agents. Such role switching is commonly used in signaling games to facilitate learning (see, e.g., Brandts & Holt, 1992; Cooper, 2003; and Kübler, Müller, & Normann, 2008) . At the end of every round, players observe the cost of the project and payoffs for both players.
The instructions explaining the game were framed in terms of a labor market, using terminology such as principal, worker, wage, and bonus. 10 We explained to participants that the task of the principal was to determine the bonus and wage, 9 In two of the sessions, we had a technical problem. In one of these sessions, we had to restart the computers after seven rounds in the main treatment. We dropped four participants from the data who could not continue after the interruption and did not finish the entire session. This leaves 156 participants. In the other session, we have missing observations for 24 participants for the last eight rounds in the main treatment. We decided to keep these observations, but there are no essential changes in our estimates if they are removed from the analysis (see part C of the supplementary material). In both cases, all participants completed all rounds of the control treatment.
10 Cooper (2003) shows that a meaningful context can accelerate learning in experiments with signaling games; Cooper et al. (1999) show that the impact of the context depends crucially on the audience (students versus managers).
and that of the agent to choose an effort level. Our conjecture is that most people associate a bonus with something positive. If so, they are, if anything, less likely to infer negative information from a bonus than if we used more neutral terminology, giving a more stringent test of the hypothesis.
The experiment was computerized using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Sessions took place between 2009 and 2011 at two Russian universities (New Economic School and Academy of National Economy, Moscow). Participants were paid for their decisions in every round, with earnings averaging 370 rubles (approximately $13). Participants in the role of the agent were paid for only one of the two projects, determined randomly to avoid the risk of hedging behavior (see Blanco et al., 2010) . Sessions lasted for about ninety minutes. All participants were economics students with no or little training in game theory or behavioral economics. A translation of the instructions is included in part B of the appendix with the supplementary content (the original is in Russian).
C. Hypotheses
Based on the propositions in the previous section, we formulate the three main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: An informed principal is more likely to offer a bonus when she observes a high level of costs, so that the bonus embodies bad news.
This first hypothesis implies that a promise of a bonus brings bad news about task difficulty. The second hypothesis stipulates that the positive direct incentive effect of the bonus outweighs this negative information:
Hypothesis 2: A bonus increases effort by the agent in the joint project.
The third hypothesis states that the negative information, contained in the bonus, is correctly inferred by the agent and reduces his intrinsic motivation:
Hypothesis 3: With an informed principal, the agent infers bad news from a bonus and reduces effort in his own project.
IV. Results
A. Main Treatment
We first discuss the results related to the qualitative predictions for the main treatment. To be conservative, we always treat the group means as the units of observation when we use nonparametric tests, giving us twelve independent observations for each condition. We did not find any indication of order effects of the conditions (I-U versus U-I groups), so we report only the results of all groups combined.
In the main treatment (informed condition), the principal observes the cost of effort and can adjust the bonus to the cost of effort. We first verify that the bonus is informative about the level of costs, which is a crucial part of the experiment. Figure 1 shows the results. It is indeed the case that the level of the bonus is very informative. When costs are high, the principal gives the bonus 80% of the time, compared to only 32% when the costs are low, and this difference is significant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z = 3.1, p = .002, two-tailed test). This shows that rewards are informative about the cost level. Table 2 shows the marginal estimates of a probit model with standard errors clustered at the group level. 11 Column 1 shows that if costs are high, the likelihood that a bonus is offered increases by 48 percentage points. In column 2, we control for the social preferences measures. Possibly the relatively fair-minded principals are more likely to give a bonus, in which case the bonus also becomes informative about the fairness of the principal. We do not find any significant effects of the social preferences variables on the likelihood of giving a bonus in the main treatment. The effect of high costs is by far the best predictor of a bonus. In section IVE, we discuss potential interaction effects with social preferences. When we consider only the first or last ten rounds (columns 3 and 4), we see that the coefficient of high costs becomes somewhat larger in the last ten rounds, but it is already large in the first ten rounds. This result confirms hypothesis 1.
Before turning to the response by the agents, it is also worthwhile to examine the fixed wages offered by the principals. The vast majority of principals give a zero fixed wage, largely independent of the observed costs. A positive wage is given 23% and 18% of the time when costs are respectively 11 We also estimated all specifications using a linear probability model with random or fixed effects at the group level and a probit model with group random effects. All specifications give very similar results. In particular, the size and significance of our main variable of interest (the impact of a bonus on effort) are robust across different specifications. low and high. Figure 2 shows that the principal is only slightly more likely to offer a positive fixed wage when she offers no bonus and the distribution of fixed wages is very similar after observing high or low costs. Thus, the upfront fixed wage is not very informative about the observed cost level by the principal. The estimates from table 2 are also essentially unchanged if we analyze the bonus and fixed-wage decisions simultaneously in a multivariate probit model (not reported).
We now turn to the behavior of agents. Before we study the impact of a bonus on effort in the own project, we examine the impact on effort in the joint project. In equilibrium, the size of the reward should offset any negative information effects and have a positive impact on effort in the joint project. Recall also that the agent receives an informative private signal about the cost of effort, giving an indication that costs are low or high. Because the agent's reaction to a bonus can differ depending on the signal, we report results for each signal. We refer to the private signal of low costs as good signal as this is positive news for the agent.
A bonus is indeed very effective in stimulating effort in the joint project. When agents receive no bonus, 22% (after a bad private signal) and 60% (after a good private signal) of the agents exert effort. After receiving a bonus, around 92% of the agents exert effort in the joint project after each signal. The two left-most bars in figure 3 show the increase in effort split by signal for the main treatment. The difference in effort between a bonus and no bonus is significant for each private signal (in both cases, Z = 3.1, p = .002, signed rank test). Table 3 reports marginal effects of probit estimations and confirms the results from the nonparametric tests. We include an interaction term for bonus and good signal since the effect of a bonus is expected to be different depending on the signal. 12 Columns 1 and 2 report the marginal effects on effort in the joint project. 13 The effect of receiving a bonus is large and significant whether or not controlling for gender and the measures of social preferences. As can be seen from the interaction term, the effect of a bonus on effort is smaller after receiving a good signal, because effort is already relatively high in that case even with no bonus. But even in that case, the bonus has a significant and large effect on effort. If we estimate these specifications separately for the first set of ten rounds and the second (last) set of ten rounds, we find that the effect of a bonus on effort in the joint project is highly significant in both cases (not reported).
Thus, we can confirm hypothesis 2 for the informed condition:
Result 2. With an informed principal, a bonus increases effort in the joint project. The next question is whether rewards are perceived correctly as informative by the agent. We can investigate this by looking at effort in the own project. The bonus offered by the principal does not apply to the own project, so the only reason that a bonus might have an impact is that the agent infers informational content from it. If so, a bonus should reduce effort. Figure 4 shows the increase in effort between a bonus and no bonus. Following a bonus, effort in the own project is about 19 percentage points lower after each signal (good and bad signal) and both differences are significant (Z > 3.0, p < .003).
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Columns 3 and 4 of table 3 report the marginal effects on effort in the own project. Being offered a bonus substantially reduces the likelihood of exerting effort on the own project. After controlling for social preferences, the coefficient is −19.5 percentage points after receiving a bad signal and reduced further by another 6.2 percentage points after a good signal. The coefficient is naturally somewhat smaller (in absolute terms) after a bad signal, because the effort is already relatively low in that case. 14 Thus, a bonus is perceived as bad news.
Since it is counterintuitive that a bonus is bad news, one may expect that participants show some learning over the course of the experiment (some further aspects regarding the participants' learning are discussed in section IVD). Figure  5 plots for every round the mean difference in effort in the own project between a bonus and no bonus (using a threeround moving average to smooth out some of the variation). Inspection of the figure reveals a clear downward trend in the difference in effort. Column 5 of table 3 shows indeed 14 The interaction effects are partially consistent with the theoretical predictions. For the joint project, the predicted effort equals 1 following a good signal independent of the bonus, so the bonus should only have a positive effect only after a bad signal. The interaction term is indeed negative, but the effect of a bonus after a good signal is also significant (the sum of coefficients for Bonus and Bonus × Good Signal is significantly different from zero, p < 0.001 in columns 1 and 2 of table 3). For the own project, the agent should be indifferent between effort and no effort after a bad signal and no bonus. Therefore, the predicted decrease in effort after a bonus is at least as large after a good signal (from 1 to 0) as after a bad signal. The absence of an interaction effect in this case would be consistent with the predictions if agents always exerted effort after a bad signal and no bonus. This would imply, however, that the good signal by itself should have no effect, which is not the case. It follows that the bonus is not interpreted as sufficiently bad news compared to the equilibrium prediction; we come back to this in section IVD. that in the first ten rounds, the effect is mostly absent after a bad signal but already present after a good signal (the sum of the coefficients for Bonus and Bonus × Good Signal is significantly different from 0, p = .028). In the last ten rounds (see column 6), the negative effect becomes very strong: after receiving a bonus, effort in the own project decreases by 34 percentage points. Thus, while a bonus is by itself a good motivator and agents respond positively to a bonus in the joint project, agents also correctly infer that a bonus conveys bad news about costs in the informed condition and so reduce investments in their own project. This effect is particularly strong in the last ten rounds. We can therefore confirm hypothesis 3: Result 3. Agents correctly infer bad news from a bonus in the informed condition and reduce effort in the own project.
Overall, our results so far provide clear support for the model. Participants in the role of principals use rewards to stimulate the agents, and when playing as the agents, they respond to these rewards as expected, including the correct inference of information.
B. Control Treatment
We also implemented the control treatment in which the principal is not informed. In this uninformed condition, we still expect that agents respond positively to rewards in the 64 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Probit estimates, reporting marginal effects. Robust SE clustered at the group level in parentheses. Coefficient and SE of interaction term corrected; see note 12. All specifications include the treatment order as a control variable. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. joint project. However, since rewards are not informative, we do not expect that effort in the own project varies with the bonus.
In the joint project, we find indeed that effort is higher after receiving a bonus (see the right two bars in figure 3 ). After both a good and a bad signal, this effect is significant (signed rank test, Z = 3.1, p = .002). This is also confirmed in the regression analysis shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 4. As figure 3 shows, the effect of the bonus on effort in the joint project is very similar in the main and the control treatments, even though the bonus contains negative information. Recall, however, the equilbrium predictions: the equilibrium probability of effort on the joint project following a bad signal and no bonus is low in both treatments (one-ninth in the main treatment and 0 in the control treatment), and it equals 1 after the bonus or good signal in both treatments. Thus, the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of the bonus in two treatments are indeed very similar.
Turning to the own project, the effort level of agents does not vary much with respect to the bonus, as expected, and any differences are not significant using nonparametric tests (see figure 4 ). After receiving a good signal, effort is 6 percentage points lower following a bonus (Z = 1.1, p = .267). After receiving a bad signal, effort is 1 percentage point lower after a bonus (Z = .12, p = .906). The regressions show that effort is not significantly different after a bonus when the signal is bad (columns 3 and 4 of table 4). After a good signal, the total effect of a bonus on effort in the own project is significantly negative, which is somewhat surprising (the sum of the coefficients for Bonus and Bonus × Good Signal is significantly different from 0: p = .001 in specification 3 and p = .012 in specification 4). However, the coefficient is modest in size (around −8 percentage points), and if we estimate the model separately for each signal, the coefficient of bonus is always small and not consistent in sign. 15 
C. Consistency with Equilibrium Predictions at the Individual Level
Results from the previous sections support the main qualitative predictions of the model. In this section, we explore how close behavior is to the equilibrium predictions, what may explain any differences, and if such differences disappear with experience.
A natural starting point is to look at the percentage of choices that are consistent with the equilibrium predictions. We look separately at the four main decisions that participants make: the choice of the bonus, the wage, and the effort levels on the joint and the own project. If the equilibrium prediction is a mixed strategy, we consider a choice of any pure strategy in its support to be consistent with the equilibrium at the individual level. We also report the percentage of consistent choices if we treat the two decisions that a participant makes in a single round (bonus and wage, or effort on the joint and own project) as a single choice pair. We compare these percentages to a random, unintelligent benchmark that would result if participants were just playing each available action with equal probability (level 0 rationality in the terminology of Stahl & Wilson, 1994) . For instance, in the main treatment, random play would result in 75% of consistent choices for the bonus: with probability 0.5, the costs are high and any choice is consistent with the equilibrium, and with probability 0.5, the costs are low and only one of the two bonuses is consistent with the equilibrium. This gives the benchmark of (0.5)(1) + (0.5)(0.5) = 0.75. Table 5 reports the results. In both the main and the control treatment, around 80% of choices is consistent if we look at the four decisions separately. One evident exception is the bonus in the control treatment. The prediction is that principals do not give a bonus in the control treatment, but in practice, most of the time (66%) they do give a bonus. This may be due to social preferences, or principals may foresee that agents are unlikely to work otherwise. The latter is partly justified, as we shall see when we analyze the agents' decisions. 16 Except for this case, we can easily reject that the percentage of consistent choices is at the benchmark 15 As in the main treatment, the theory predicts that a bonus or a good signal is sufficient for high effort in the joint project, so the interaction effect must be negative. This is what we find, even though the absolute value is somewhat smaller than predicted. The agent should work on the own project if and only if the signal is good, so there should be no interaction effect of the bonus and the good signal. This is what we find.
16 Social preferences may be only a partial explanation. Results from a regression analysis indicates that "fair" principals are 21 percentage points more likely to give a bonus in the control treatment ( p < .01), while none of the other measures of social preferences is related (regressions are not reported but are available on request). Yet even the "nonfair" principals still give a bonus 55% of the time. a The benchmark numbers refer to the percentage of choices that one could expect to be consistent if participants randomized their decisions with equal probabilities over the possible choices. When estimating this number for the agent, we assumed the principal plays as in equilibrium.
b In parentheses are the p-values of the test that the percentage of consistent choices in the second half of a treatment is equal to that in the first half (signed rank tests with the mean of a participant over the rounds as the independent unit of observation).
of random play. 17 The percentage of consistent choices is naturally somewhat lower if we look at the two decisions as a single choice pair, but also in those cases, we can reject that the percentage of consistent choices is at the benchmark of random play for every case. 18 The above approach is not the most conservative, because in case of mixed strategies, it does not restrict the choices of strategies to match the predicted probabilities. We can decompose the choices depending on the situation that participants face. This gives further insights into where choices deviate from the equilibrium predictions and allows us to compare the predicted mixing probabilities to behavior at the aggregate level.
The fraction of times that principals give a bonus after observing high cost (80%) is on aggregate not far from the equilibrium probability of two-thirds. After observing the low costs, principals give a bonus substantially more often than the equilibrium prediction (32% on average instead of 0). As we already saw, principals in the control treatment are much more likely to give a bonus than the equilibrium prediction (66% on average instead of 0).
The decisions of agents for every possible case are summarized in table 6. The numbers in brackets are the equilibrium predictions. Overall, actual decisions are reasonably close to the equilibrium predictions. There are, however, a few instances where we observe a large divergence between actual and predicted behavior. We now turn to each of these deviations.
In the main treatment, the probability of high effort on the own project after receiving a good signal and a bonus (65%) is much higher than predicted (0 percent). This indicates that 17 The p-values based on one-sided t-tests are always below 0.01 (taking the mean of a participant over all rounds as the unit of independent observations). Using a nonparametric sign test gives similar results.
18 With p-values always below 0.01 using one-sided t-tests. The nonparametric sign test gives similar results except that it does not reject the hypothesis that the frequency of choices is at or below the benchmark level for the case "Bonus and Wage" in the control treatment ( p = 0.93).
participants do not perceive the high bonus as sufficiently bad news. From the regressions in the previous section, we already saw that the effect of the high bonus on the own project is smaller than predicted by the equilibrium analysis. On the one hand, this may be caused by the fact that the bonus is less informative than predicted, since the bonus is also often given when costs are low, as we saw before. On the other hand, we also saw that participants need to learn that the bonus is bad news and that the effect becomes stronger over the rounds.
The other main deviation from the equilibrium is that effort on the joint project after receiving a good signal is much lower than the predicted 100%: only 60% in the main treatment and 41% in the control treatment. A potential reason could be that agents underestimate the strength of the good signal. This explanation is refuted by the data, however, since agents do exert effort on the own project after receiving a good signal and no bonus. Another explanation is that other-regarding considerations play a role. Conceivably agents are unwilling to work on the joint project as a punishment to the principal for not giving a bonus. While social preferences seem to play only a limited role in most of the decisions (see section IVE), here we found evidence that fairness plays an important role. When they receive a bonus, both "fair" and "nonfair" agents exert effort about 90% of the time in each treatment. When they do not receive a bonus, nonfair agents still work 78% of the time in the control treatment and 71% of the time in the main treatment. By contrast, without a bonus, fair agents work only 22% of the time in the control treatment and 46% of the time in the main treatment. The difference in effort between the two types of agents is by far the largest effect of social preferences that we have found, and the difference is significant in both cases (Wilcoxon rank sum tests, p < 0.02 in both treatments).
D. Learning and Order Effects
Is there convergence to the equilibrium? To address this question, we compare the frequency of consistent choices in 66 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Mean fraction of times that an agent exerts effort over all rounds. The numbers in brackets are the equilibrium predictions. a In equilibrium, the agent is indifferent between effort and no effort on the own project following a bad signal and no bonus.
the second half to that of the first half of each treatment. The increase in the frequency of consistent choices is reported in column 3 of table 5, and we report the p-values of the test that the increase is 0 (in parentheses). We indeed observe that the percentage of consistent choices is often somewhat higher in the second half of a treatment and the difference between the first and second half is often significantly different from 0. The most notable exceptions are the bonus and effort on the joint project, both in the control treatment. We also find that the percentage of participants for whom all the decisions in a given part are consistent with equilibrium predictions increases substantially in the main treatment (from 8% in the first half to 29% in the second half). This increase is much more modest in the control treatment (7% in the first half, 13% in the second half). One may expect that the frequency of consistent choices depends, besides experience, on the role or treatment that a participant started in. In particular, one may conjecture that participants who started in the role of a principal understand the information effect more quickly than those who started as an agent. As a principal, they are in a better position to reflect on the informational content of the bonus. We find only weak evidence for this conjecture. We specifically look at the effort on the own project in the main treatment, since we already saw that agents need time to infer the bad news from a bonus. Those who started as a principal indeed appear to react more negatively to a bonus, but the effect is weak. After a good signal, we find that participants who start as a principal on average reduce their effort after receiving a bonus by 22 percentage points, against 17 percentage points when they start as an agent. The difference is larger after a bad signal: those who start as a principal reduce effort by 24 percentage points after a bonus, against 16 percentage points for those who start as an agent. Averaged over the two possible signals, the difference between the starting roles is not significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, Z = −0.71, p = 0.470). Even for the case where we find the smallest reduction in effort (when they start as an agent and receive a bad signal), the effect is still significantly different from 0 (Z = −2.353, p = 0.019). In Section d of the appendix in the supplementary material, we also reproduce the figures for all of the other main results (figures D1 to D3) and do not find any indication that behavior is very different when they start as a principal.
Another possible effect is the order in which treatments are presented. Since the only difference between the main and control treatment is whether the principal is informed, going from one treatment to the next may have made it salient to participants that there are possible information effects. However, if we repeat the main analysis for the subset of participants in their first treatment, the results are very similar (see figures D1 to D3 in appendix D): a bonus is significantly more likely if costs are high, the effort in the joint project is significantly higher after a bonus in each treatment and for each signal, while the effort in the own project is significantly lower after a bonus in the main treatment (all p-values in these cases are smaller than .03). Effort in the own project is not significantly lower after a bonus in the control treatment ( p = 0.75 after a bad signal, p = .29 after a good signal).
While choices are on average often consistent with the equilibrium, there is heterogeneity among participants. Are those participants who often play consistently in the later rounds the same as those in the first rounds? To examine this question, we split the sample into quartiles based on the percentage of consistent choices in the first half of a treatment. Figure 6 shows for each quartile the average number of consistent choices in the first half and how the participants in that quartile do in the second half. We see that in both treatments, the difference between participants in the bottom and top quartile in the first half is somewhat reduced in the second half: participants who started far from equilibrium play catch-up during the game.
E. The Role of Social Preferences and Gender
We now investigate in more detail the role of social preferences. Many studies have shown that people care about the distribution of payoffs and the intentions of others. There is little reason to suspect that social preferences are driving our key result that a bonus is perceived as bad news. In particular, the effort decision for the own project does not affect payoffs for the other participant, so there is no reason to expect that the negative effect of a bonus in the own project is driven by social preferences rather than reflecting informational effects. Furthermore, if principals are concerned about inequalities in payoffs resulting from not offering a bonus, they could partially address this by adjusting the fixed wage. Nevertheless, we believe it is interesting to examine the extent to which the response to a bonus in the joint project is driven by social preferences. We reported earlier that "fair" principals are 21 percentage points less likely to give a bonus in the control treatment, but other than this, we find very little evidence that a subject's social preferences determine in any substantial way whether she is more likely to offer a bonus when acting as a principal. In table 2, we showed that the costs are the most important determinant of the bonus in the main treatment. None of the measures of social preferences outlined above has a significant impact. We also did not find evidence of any substantial interaction effects. That is, the estimated coefficient of high costs is broadly similar if model 1 of table 2 is estimated separately for the subsets of participants who are above and below the median for each of the measures of social preferences. We also find little evidence that social preferences play a role in the effort choice in the joint project that subjects make when acting as agents. Most coefficients related to social preferences are insignificant and relatively small. "Fair" agents tend to exert somewhat lower effort in the joint project and "altruists" somewhat higher effort (column 2 of tables 3). 19 Arguably the most interesting finding with respect to social preferences concerns the response to different levels of the fixed wage. Figure 7 plots the mean effort in the joint project for the two conditions for no bonus and bonus (solid lines). In the main treatment (informed condition, left panel), the effort does not vary much with the fixed wage. In the control treatment (uninformed condition, right panel), we find a Ushaped pattern: the mean effort is lower after a fixed wage of 5 than after 0 wage, but then increases again when the fixed wage is 10. The regressions also show a negative effect of offering a fixed wage of 5 in the uninformed condition (table 4, columns 1 and 2) but not in the informed condition (table 3, columns 1 and 2). 20 We may speculate that possibly participants think that a small fixed wage is more of an insult if the principal is uninformed, because in that case, the principal is not offering it as a compensation for high costs.
This wage effect is reminiscent of the "small payment" effect found in other experiments, such as in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) , who also find that motivation is lower for small payments than under no compensation at all but increases for higher payments. However, they find this using piece rates, while in our case, we find that pattern with respect to a fixed wage. We also find that the U-shaped pattern is somewhat more pronounced for participants with a level of reciprocity that is above the median (the dashed lines in figure  7 ). It is possible that agents interpret a fixed wage of 5 as coming from an unfair principal. An ordered probit analysis indicates that "fair" principals are somewhat more likely to offer a positive fixed wage, while none of the other social preferences has an effect. 21 The effect is somewhat larger in the main treatment with an informed principal (roughly 12 percentage points) than in the control treatment (roughly 5 percentage points), but there is not much difference in the higher likelihood of offering a wage of 5 or 10 by fair principals. Perhaps principals only rarely offer a fixed wage of 5 because they realize that this has an adverse effect on effort. In any case, because of the rare occurrences, all of these results should be taken with some caution.
While we control for gender in all regressions, with a single exception we find no significant gender effects. The only significant gender effect is that effort is higher for women in the own project of the main treatment, but this disappears in later rounds (column 6 of table 3). Reporting this result may nevertheless be important for avoiding a publication or reporting bias against finding null results (no gender difference), as Croson and Gneezy (2009) argued.
V. Conclusion
Our experiment shows that when the principal is better informed about the characteristics of a task than the agent, rewards have hidden costs, as Bénabou and Tirole (2003) predicted. The principal is more likely to offer a bonus when she knows the task is difficult and the agent correctly perceives this.
The experimental design allows us to isolate the informational effects of rewards. Of course, by no means does this imply that other factors such as social preferences are not important. As discussed in section I, a large experimental literature shows that rewards may have a strong negative impact on motivation even when the principal does not have superior information about the task. The main channel in that case is the impact of rewards on fairness, reciprocity, and trust-related concerns. We view our paper as an important complement to that literature, showing that the interaction of extrinsic incentives and intrinsic motivation is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a single idea or theory. Investigation of the interaction between pure informational and fairness-related effects seems to be an important topic for future research, both theoretical and experimental.
A natural extension would be to conduct an experiment with a real effort task to test the external validity of our findings. The challenge will be to implement the required two-sided information asymmetry in a controlled manner. Another robustness check would be to investigate the impact of role switching. On the one hand, we believe that this element of design helps participants understand the features of that game more quickly. In reality, people have more time to learn than we give them in the lab. On the other hand, many people are always on the same side of the relationship and may not have an opportunity or incentive to take another perspective. For instance, some people will never hold a managerial job, and they may fail to understand the exact motives behind the employer's choice of rewards.
Since in real life the hidden costs we explore may have only a delayed impact, an important venue for further experimental research is the study of repeated relationships. A model in Suvorov (2003) shows that in this case, rewards become "addictive" if the agent's opportunities to independently acquire information about the task are limited. Two new strategic effects arise in the model: the agent tries to appear unmotivated to convince the principal to give a high bonus in the future, and the principal is concerned about promising a bonus and thus creating "addiction to rewards." Finally, we emphasize that the experimental research of the information transmission via rewards need not be restricted to an investigation of a negative impact. For instance, the model in Suvorov and van de Ven (2009) shows that noncontractible ex post rewards can occur even in a finitely repeated relationship if the principal has superior information about the agent's interim performance. It shows that rewards may also have informational content in that case, but the information becomes good rather than bad news. Such discretionary rewards signal that the principal appreciates previous efforts and has high expectations about future achievements, thus giving a boost to the agent's motivation in the remaining periods.
APPENDIX A
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
From part ii of proposition 1, it follows that there are five possible types of equilibria: two types of pooling equilibria (the principal always giving no bonus or always giving bonus b), a separating equilibrium (no bonus when costs are low, b when costs are high), and two types of hybrid (partially separating) equilibria. In hybrid equilibria of the first type, no bonus is offered when the project is easy, and the principal randomizes between no bonus and bonus b when it is difficult. In the second type of hybrid equilibria, bonus b is offered when the project is difficult and the principal randomizes between no bonus and bonus b when it is easy.
Note first that the separating equilibrium and the second type of partially separating (hybrid) equilibria cannot occur under our assumptions. In such equilibria, the principal would always prefer to deviate and give no bonus because this induces the agent to exert high effort.
Moreover, a pooling equilibrium in which the principal offers a strictly positive bonus is eliminated by D1 (or by NWBR, which is equivalent to D1 in the current game). 22 Suppose, by contradiction, that the equilibrium is pooling with bonus b always being offered. The agent always exerts effort in this case. Let the agent's response to the out-of-equilibrium bonus b = 0 be such that he chooses e = 1 with probabilities μ H and μ L when his signal is s H and s L , respectively. Consider the response by the agent that would make the principal indifferent between offering b = b and deviating to b = 0 when costs are high (c = c H ). Then the principal would strictly gain from deviation to b = 0 when costs are low (c = c L ) whenever (2r − 1)ΔP(μ L − μ H ) > 0. It is straightforward to show that the latter condition holds given that the principal's indifference implies (μ H , μ L ) = (1, 1), (0, 0) and given that it must be the case that μ H < μ L for the agent's strategy to be a (mixed) best response for some (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs. The NWBR criterion then stipulates that the agent should assign probability 0 to c = c H after observing b = 0, giving incentives for the principal to deviate, which upsets the equilibrium (see Cho & Kreps, 1987) .
It is straightforward to check that under the chosen values of parameters, the strategies specified in proposition 2 indeed form a hybrid equilibrium, while the pooling equilibrium with no bonus does not occur. In the pooling 22 For a general definition of D1 and NWBR refinements, see Cho and Kreps (1987) ; Cho and Sobel (1990) prove that they are equivalent in montonic games. In our model, a never-weak-best-response (NWBR) is defined as follows. Consider the agent's reaction to an out-of-equilibrium offer b that is (a) a best response under some beliefs and (b) makes the principal indifferent between sticking to an equilibrium action and deviating to b when the cost is c = c i . For an equilibrium to satisfy NWBR, out-of equilibrium beliefs must assign probability 0 to the value of cost c i if the principal strictly gains from the deviation to b under this agent's reaction if the cost c = c j = c i .
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
equilibrium with b = 0, the agent works after signal s L but not after signal s H . Thus, if costs are high, the principal expects the agent to exert effort with probability 1 − r (the likelihood that the signal is incorrect). The principal would prefer deviating to b (inducing the agent to exert effort for any signal) if b < rΔP, which is the case under our parameters. Note first that a contract (w, b) with w > 0 cannot be offered with a positive probability in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium: with this bonus, the agent always exerts effort for any beliefs about the costs, so this contract is strictly dominated by the contract (0, b) .
B. Proof
Next, let us show that if contract ( Assume now that contract (w, 0) with w > 0 is offered with a positive probability. If this contract were offered only in the case c = c H , the agent would exert no effort and the principal would deviate to (0, 0). Assume now that contract (w, 0) is offered in case c = c L only. Then the agent is sure to exert effort if offered this contract. Denote again by μ H and μ L the probabilities that the agent exerts effort if offered contract (0, 0) and his signal is s H and s L , respectively. Then, since the principal must be indifferent between (w, 0) and (0, 0) when costs are low and weakly prefer (0, 0) to (w, 0) when costs are high, we have
Since μ H ≤ μ L and μ L = 1 if μ H > 0, this implies μ H = μ L = 1 or μ H = μ L = 0. We get a contradiction: the first option violates a > 0, and the second implies that the principal would want to deviate to (0, b) under both cost realizations.
Hence, the principal should offer both contracts (0, 0) and (w, 0) with a positive probability in both cases: c = c L and c = c H . Denote byμ H and μ L the probabilities that the agent exerts effort if offered contract (w, 0) and his signal is s H and s L , respectively. For the principal to be indifferent between the contracts, we must have 
